Opposition’s first steps for 2024

The contours of the national Opposition strategy will slowly become clearer over the next few months. But there are three principal hurdles on the way. The first has little to do with plans of Opposition unity, and more to do with the BJP’s enduring strength at the voting booths. In 2019, the BJP won 224 seats with a vote share percentage greater than 50%. In 2014, this number was 136. Only in 48 constituencies was the combined vote share of the number two- and three-ranked candidates higher than the BJP nominee. This means that mere arithmetic will not work, and the Opposition will need to find a way to wean large numbers of people away from the BJP. This is exactly what the Congress did in Karnataka, where entire communities moved away from the BJP after a generation, but replicating this at the national level – especially in the northern states that are the BJP’s stronghold – will be far more challenging.

The second hurdle is ideological. To dent the BJP in the 224 seats where it comprehensively won will need a strong narrative that is both ideologically coherent, pragmatic and popular. The Opposition’s experience with Uttar Pradesh (UP) in 2019 – when the two Mandal giants, the Samajwadi Party (SP) and the Bahujan Samaj Party (BSP) came together in an unprecedented alliance, only to be undone by grassroots contradictions in their core demographic bases – will be instructive. Until now, Opposition parties have tinkered with their messaging around welfare, caste census, upliftment of marginalised communities, allegations of democratic backsliding, and economic distress, but are yet to zero in on a winning narrative. This will be pivotal. The third hurdle is political, and directly tied to the geographical spread of regional and national parties. At least 124 of the BJP’s 303 seats in 2019 came from states where Opposition parties are often in contest with each other, and where Opposition unity will be difficult to achieve. Take, for example, West Bengal, where the Trinamool Congress is in contest not only with the BJP but also the Congress and the Left. Or UP, where four major parties – the BJP, SP, BSP and Congress – are in the fray. It is in these regions that internal contradictions in the Opposition camp (how do the Aam Aadmi Party and the Congress come together while fighting for control over Delhi and Punjab, or how do the Left and the Congress manage an arrangement nationally while being the principal contenders for power in Kerala?) will need to be deftly managed. And finally, while Opposition unity can have its benefits and drawbacks, it may end up meaning little if there is no change in the political fortunes in 160-odd seats where the BJP and the Congress were in direct contest and where the former trounced the latter comprehensively. Unless the Congress can put up a stronger fight, the BJP will have the edge going into 2024. Madhya Pradesh, Chhattisgarh and Rajasthan will tell us whether it remains the case this winter.